Use policy
There are two established ways of recounting the emergence of the modern Gulf oil monarchies: One type, the social scientific one, tends to tell the reader of anonymous structural forces, of the "resource curse", of the "rentier state", and of how these forces have shaped politics and markets with their inexorable logic. The other narrative, of the popular history variety, offers us romantic, personalized accounts of desert shaykhs, their whims, and the sudden riches of their families (complemented by tales of monumental corruption in some less benevolent tales).
In its analysis of the creation of the Saudi Arabian administration, this article will, to a surprising degree perhaps, side with the shaykhs. This is despite -or rather because of -its ambition of being theoretically informed: By stressing the role of elite decisions in the process of state creation in Saudi Arabia, it will try to bring personality and politics back into the structurally over-determined accounts of the creation of Gulf states and rentier systems in general. 1 The article will look specifically at the formative period of state formation between 1951 and 1962, when the interplay of administrative growth and elite politics, patronage and factionalism was the most intense and the institutional setting the most fluid. The account has three main explanatory aims: First, to explain how early conflicts and deals between senior political figures "congealed" into institutional constellations which have shaped the kingdom's political landscape until today. Rapidly growing oil income temporarily gave the Saudi political elite great autonomy in designing the shape of their expanding state, and institutions were unusually flexible tokens in power games.
Secondly, the article intends to explain how the Saudi administration developed a certain degree of segmentation early on, i.e. the tendency of various institutions to be little "states within the state" -a feature closely related to the early personalization of institutional design.
This segmentation has allowed the emergence of a few very efficient bureaucratic islands, but has also led to failures of coordination and the parallel building of neo-patrimonial bureaucratic fiefdoms, a feature still much in evidence in today's kingdom. Increasing bureaucratization and regularization has often only solidified these cleavages.
Thirdly, the article explains how the extreme social mobility offered by a rapidly expanding state and its social networks created new players in the economic and political elite. This fluidity is in marked contrast to today's mature and very static Saudi system in which most stakes have been "parcelled out", both in business and bureaucracy. Much of the Saudi elite and its institutions were made in a dozen dizzying years in the 1950s and 1960s.
In theoretical terms, the aim of the article is to nuance several of the assumptions of the debate on "rentier states" by closely looking at the actual history of bureaucratic evolution of Saudi Arabia, the literature's staple rentier example. I intend to show that the autonomy of rentier states is not constant over time, as constraints grow with bureaucratic expansion. I also demonstrate that external state income does not necessarily lead to inefficient institutions, but rather opens great leeway for institutional design which can be highly efficient in some areas and patrimonial in others. 
The literature
While much has been written on the impact of the USA on the formation of modern Saudi Arabia, 2 little research has been done on the internal politics of the formation of the modern Saudi state. Sarah Yizraeli's valuable "The remaking of Saudi Arabia" 3 remains the only account primarily concerned with Saudi elite politics in the 1950s and early 60s, which I hope to complement from a more institutional perspective: Yizraeli concentrates mainly on the struggle between Faisal, Saud and their princely followers and is less concerned with the formation and composition of bureaucracy as such. The fiefdom character and segmentation of administration and its interplay with personal politics on various levels therefore are not in the focus of her analysis, which results in a certain overemphasis on the "modern" aspects of institutional growth and differentiation under Faisal.
While Yizraeli focuses strongly on persons, the other main account of modern state formation in Saudi Arabia, Kiren Aziz Chaudhry's "The Price of Wealth", conversely talks almost exclusively about structural economic forces and institutions. Individual actors are largely absent from her account, which means that many specifics of institution-building I focus on go unexplained, and rationality and capacity of the early Saudi administration are considerably exaggerated. 4 My claim is that focusing on the interplay of personal politics and institutional formation offers the most adequate perspective on the formative years of the modern Saudi state.
In addition to contributing to the still very thin historiography of Saudi state-building, my ambition is to challenge and contextualize several of the broader theoretical claims of rentier state theories, for which Saudi Arabia has often been used as archetypical case. There is no fully formulated, generally accepted rentier state theory. There are however a number of recurring hypotheses connected to effects of oil income on politics.
First, rentier theorists usually argue that oil income grants state elites increased autonomy from social forces. 5 Kiren Chaudhry was right to challenge this generalization in her account of the economic crisis in the 1980s, 6 in which entrenched distributional coalitions managed to stall the regime's austerity policies. I argue, however, that regime autonomy was considerably higher at an early state of state-building, before distributional networks and entitlements were established on a large scale. In other words, state autonomy of rentier states seems to decline over time. This highlights the importance of early institutional decisions, which can create strong path-dependencies which are not accounted for in "static" rentier theories. Modern bureaucracy is a recent phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. Its first elements were created in the early 1950s during King Abdalaziz' last years, when oil income was taking off.
In the lean years before, the kingdom had not been ruled through a differentiated administrative apparatus, but rather through trusted regional governors installed by the king, supported by other local intermediaries and clients, be it notables or tribal shuyukh.
On the national level, the system completely revolved around Abdalaziz, who was king, chief legislator and had the right to review all judicial decisions. 12 Most of the departments at Abdalaziz' court were occupied with the logistics of the court itself and not broader administration or public services. 13 In the Western Province, taken from the Hashemites in the mid-1920s, Abdalaziz had inherited a somewhat more elaborate bureaucratic structure, with special offices e.g. for health and education.
14 Altogether, however, most Saudis had no contact with formal administration, as apart from basic security, the state provided hardly any services to its citizens. There were few formal, national bodies during most of Abdalaziz' reign: A ministry of foreign affairs had been set up in 1930 under Faisal. Ministries of Finance and Defense followed in 1937 and 1944. These agencies were not linked through formal mechanisms of budgeting or governance. 15 After WWII, oil income started to grow rapidly -from 10.4 million US$ in 1946 to 56.7 million US$ in 1950. 16 While old Abdalaziz' personal rule grew increasingly slack due to his frailty, 17 there was a growing need to manage the huge sums of money flowing into the kingdom, as at least his second oldest surviving son Faisal and the American diplomats and oilmen present at the time realized. 18 In the absence of any scheme for budgeting and development, much of the growing oil income was frittered away by the court, its clients and their entourages. 19 There was another reason for institution-building: With the unquestioned patriarch leaving the stage, a new generation of princes vied for power and prestige, 20 giving them a stake in the creation of new posts and ministries.
Analysis: a state created above society
The state would soon start to grow rapidly, providing posts for numerous princely aspirants. In the following I will indeed argue that the way the state grew was an outcome largely of royal elite decisions unconstrained by larger political forces. To substantiate that, some social history is needed before I engage with princely dealings in detail.
In the 1950s, the national income was still extremely small by standards of modern statehood. However, the aggregate societal demands on it were even smaller: 21 Saudi society, based on an economy which in most regions barely provided for subsistence needs, was unprepared for the riches. Most politics was local as people were ruled through the Al Saud's tribal or notable intermediaries. The kingdom knew no public space to negotiate over national budgets, which were fed externally and grew rather suddenly. Saudi Arabia had no national constitution, no formal mechanisms of political participation, and no experience of national politics. Society was deeply geographically fragmented.
There were no large and coherent social groups to voice demands towards the government.
Merchants were quickly tied up in patronage structures. 22 Their Chambers of Commerce were state-created, state-dependent and had little voice in policy-making. 23 Aramco researchers described Saudi businessman as "more individualistic" than their counterparts in other places, not interested in collective bargaining 24 -which is indeed completely absent from the historical record.
Similarly, the independent power of tribes had been crushed in the course of Abdalaziz'
conquest of the peninsula in the 1920s and 1930s, 25 and were subsequently co-opted through royal subsidies, without much modern state infrastructure interfering or being demanded. 26 The kingdom had no working class -with the exception of Aramco workers in the Eastern Province, whose demonstrations were harshly repressed in the 1950s and 1960s. 27 Newspapers were all closely supervised by the state, their boards usually controlled by princes or senior public servants. 28 Robert Vitalis cites a US labor attaché's early 1950s conclusion that Aramco "can ignore public opinion, which is neither a force nor a voice" 29 . American "New Dealers" on a technical cooperation mission looked in vain for grassroots initiatives to support in Saudi society. Municipal elections in the early 1960s were purely local phenomena in which governors could clearly control who would get elected and who not, 30 and in which the population at large tended to take limited interest. 31 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there were no parties or other national interest organizations to speak of. The consultative council still extant in the Western Province had no real political role and no popular backing.
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The Saudi ulama, finally, were an important part of the ruling elite, but despite popular myths, consistently deferred to royal prerogative, as was indeed their ideology. 33 As far as they played a role on policy, this concerned matters of public morals, but not the specifics of bureaucracy-building.
34
With no national political traditions and most Saudis not in touch with the administration, society hardly constrained the decisions which royal elites took on building their state. A unique pattern of bureaucracy-building ensued in which yet embryonic institutions became tokens of intra-elite bargaining among ambitious princes, and a limited number of commoners clients. There was of course an underlying concern to build institutions which could administer the increasing flow of oil income 35 according to the patrimonial style of his father, basing his rule on the court and embarking on grand tours through the country in which he disbursed royal largesse. 37 Decision-making on major national questions remained largely informal, 38 and although service provision improved in some sectors, governance was marred by "princely jealousies". 39 Institutional design: "form follows family"
It was largely intra-family patrimonial politics which determined who would receive which government post -not different from other clan-based, administratively underdeveloped political systems. However, patrimonial politics also determined much of the very institutional design of the rapidly growing state during Abdalaziz' last years and under his first successor.
Institutions in the 1950s were malleable and often adjusted to the authority and status of the persons or factions leading them -or occasionally created from scratch to either bolster or weaken specific players. Although there was a general trend of functional differentiation, concerns of power balancing were as important in the emergence of specific bureaucratic designs: princes had to be accorded roles according to their seniority, while also satisfying their ambitions as far as possible. Suroor). Talal told US diplomats that this was essentially a solution to avoid picking one of the various princely candidates for the post and offending the others. 43 There was no indication that qualification played a great role in creating and apportioning posts: more talented princes operated next to worse ones. 44 As far as we know, no prince was ever fired for performance failure in the 1950s or 1960s. Although the historical record does not allow us to establish the precise motivations for every specific institutional decision, we can conclude that balances of power and personal ambitions within the Al Saud have played a uniquely prominent role.
It seems that the tailoring of institutions around personal needs and conflicts was also Under King Saud, senior appointments and institutional changes were increasingly a function of his rivalry with Crown Prince Faisal. Apart from Talal, all new princely appointments to his "reform" cabinet had no administrative experience to speak ok, 48 clearly
indicating that building a coalition in the family was his main concern. The Saud-Faisal struggle has been recounted in detail elsewhere. 49 A few examples of how it affected the institutional set-up of the kingdom will suffice. The defence establishment was a prime battleground, in terms of successive appointments, but also administrative engineering. King
Saud detached the Royal Guard under Mus c ad bin Saud from the Ministry of Defense to weaken Mish c al and strengthen his own sons. The Guard temporarily was the most powerful military unit. 50 In May 1955, Saud decreed the formation of a modern National Guard which was to be headed by another of his sons, Khalid bin Saud. This again was seen as a step against Mish c al, who had been able to prey on National Guard resources before, as it had been a relatively weak institution headed by a commoner. 51 In 1964, after Saud's final defeat by Faisal, the Royal Guard was attached to the Ministry of Defence, implying its disbandment as independent institution. Institutional design followed power politics, sometimes resulting in the parallel existence of very similar structures. Most senior figures used the institutions they controlled to personally distribute favours and conclude business deals. King Saud himself built up a following of contractors whom he delighted with large contracts for palaces and grossly oversized ministries. 54 Minister of Defence Mish c al -known as one of the richest princes in subsequent decades 55 -was said to have used his privileged post to keep millions of freshly minted riyals for himself, as did a number of regional governors. 56 Most princes in bureaucratic positions quickly surrounded themselves with growing numbers of hangers-on, advisors and business partners. 57 Different princes had different followings: Saud tended to cling to the old foreign advisors of his father, 58 whereas Faisal had a larger number of Hijazi among his clients. 59 Fahd later on would bring more young educated Najdis into the state apparatus. 60 Senior clients all had an urban background in common: often from client notable families, sometimes upstarts of indistinct background who would work their way up as loyal servants. Tribes were not represented in the new elite. 61 More important in our context is that the elite was very small in size and built in a top-down fashion by princes, with hierarchies between princes and commoners very strict. 62 Clienteles were local and did not represent broader social groups, as most of society remained outside of the state's reach.
Formal and informal authority in a fluctuating bureaucracy Saudi Arabia largely lacked an administrative tradition and societal checks on the bureaucracy. Combined with family politics, this meant that the unprecedented growth of the bureaucracy in the 1950s was not accompanied by much rationalization. Although some new agencies helped to increase the provision of public services, 63 the sudden availability of resources also led to uncontrolled, Byzantine expansion based on patronage.
Many of the young administrators were highly inexperienced, especially the royal ones, who had without exception been educated only in the royal court. 64 The personalized nature of institutions went along with a lack of meaningful formal procedures. In the 1950s, there were no proper systems of civil service training, seniority or even document filing. 67 The US embassy at the time was trying to keep track of administrative development and drew charts of agencies, but "…the diagrams themselves have proved to be most confused, since this Government does not lend itself at all well to such schematic presentation, …the organization is so confused, particularly among the lower echelons, that an unwarranted level of research would be required in order to fill out charts at all these levels…since organization means little to this Government, it is very flexible and changes with such rapidity that charts are outmoded almost before they can be prepared." 68 Aramco at the time kept a roster of Saudi public personnel, on which the government itself depended due to lack of oversight over its fluctuating institutions. 69 Several agencies, such as the Ministry of Economy created in July 1953, remained merely on paper, 70 as did senior ministerial positions. 71 When posts were actually filled, they frequently were just depositories for clients of ministers or princes, adding "excess baggage" to the bureaucracy. 72 Informal authority determined the actual importance of institutions: The bits of bureaucracy which mattered were run by important princes or by commoners very close to the court. A formally important institution like the Ministry of Commerce, although headed by leading Hijazi merchant Mohammad Alireza, proved to be largely powerless. 73 Undercut by successive Ministers of Finance with better royal access, and with no commercial regulations emerging from the Council of Ministers, he complained about de facto having no role. 74 Conversely, a previously inconsequential post such as that of comptroller general suddenly became important when it was filled by senior prince Mus c ad bin c Abdalrahman. 75 As far as institutions mattered, their day-to-day operations were often carried out rather autonomously, with ministries run as fiefdoms. 76 The administrative sprawl and personalized nature of authority meant that coordination between agencies was largely lacking, with different institutions often producing directly contradictory decisions and jurisdictions remaining unclear. 77 As early as 1952, six different entities were supposed to be in charge of economic planning. Sulaiman himself, based in Jeddah, was given large administrative discretion by the king. 86 His brother Hamad and his son Abdalaziz were vice and deputy minister respectively, the higher rank for his brother being created specifically for him (it still exists today). 87 Apart from profiteering activities, Hamad was reported to be largely inactive. 88 Sulaiman had started to procure government supplies through figureheads in the 1920s, and his friends among the merchants lent him money without interest, which was in turn used to purchase goods for the court for inflated prices. 89 He was given the lucrative cement franchise for the Hijaz in the late 40s. 90 Sulaiman owned palaces and large tracts of land, and had his own entourage of some 400 people. Sharbatli accumulated a total reported credit of 43 million Saudi Riyal with the government. Unable to redeem the debt for himself, Sharbatli became one of the biggest charitable benefactors in the kingdom, recovering some of the sums for this purpose. He had become one of the richest men in the kingdom, had a virtual monopoly on pilgrim travel and had reportedly given 500.000 Riyal for the establishment of the Saudi Air Force. 94 He also set up his own bank. 95 Sharbatli's case illustrates that, although the royal family was clearly at the center of the polity and of state growth, more or less random networks of commoners within and around the administration had great distributional leeway and offered great mobility at an early stage -and the chance to position oneself for later decades.
The story of Sulaiman himself however also demonstrates how the local power of Arabia. 96 Interested in minimal economic stability, the US embassy and Aramco successfully lobbied with the king to accept US consultants into the kingdom. for what was to become SAMA within a few hours. 97 SAMA would derive its income by charging the government for its services. Its first head was also an American, and accountants were hired from Lebanon. 
The emerging bureaucratic order under Faisal
Faisal's order by cabinet US pressure was largely ineffective under Saud, with politics and institutional change following elite dynamics as described above: despite US lobbying, no coherent budgeting happened, 101 and an American Point IV assistance mission was cancelled. 102 It was under
Faisal that some degree of order was brought into the government apparatus, as is explained in the following section. But again, this was at least as much driven by royal family politics as Aramco researchers, Faisal sat on decisions. 107 Liberal Saudis, although sometimes conceding that Faisal stuck to formal rules more clearly than Saud, deplored such over-centralization. 108 The Council of Ministers was, most of all, an instrument for Faisal to gain power through the post of Prime Minister. 109 It is true that after Saud's fall from grace in 1962, it improved policy coordination somewhat -not least because the royal diwan as parallel political actor had disappeared. Faisal was generally willing to devote more time to the formal workings of government, 110 seeing a degree of budgetary control and more clearly defined administrative units as instruments of stability. Most of his reformist ambitions beyond the establishment of basic order petered out soon after Saud had been stripped off all powers in 1964, however. In a period of regional turmoil, Faisal was interested in stability, not rapid development.
Saud, through his alliance with junior princes, seemed to temporarily introduce more players into decision-making. This was an outcome of his alliance strategy though, as was the progressive-developmentalist orientation of the new cabinet -he had relied on his father's small and closed group of decidedly reactionary Syrian advisors before. 111 His younger royal allies in turn were further down in the seniority ranking -one can speculate that they saw progressive politics as a shortcut to positions of power otherwise unavailable to them.
In any case, the reformist episode proved short-lived, as Faisal's coalition with Fahd and his full brothers drove out first Talal and his brothers, then Saud. Tellingly, it was the group which had built the larger alliance within the royal family which carried the day. At no point in the struggle were broader social constituencies mobilized. 112 Talal and his princely allies might have banked on support by "young intellectuals", having seen the revolutionary examples of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. In Saudi Arabia, however, this stratum remained small, amorphous and incapable of action. Talal failed to rouse support. Sticking to established patrimonial patterns, they brought in full brothers to take up specially designated vice ministry posts in subsequent years. 118 Sultan has kept his ministry ever since, while Fahd handed his portfolio over to his younger brother Nayef when becoming
Crown Prince in 1975. Prince Abdallah, another ally of Faisal, was given cabinet status and control of the National Guard in 1963, which he again kept until today. In 1967, the special post of "second deputy prime minister" was created for Fahd, underlining his ambitions to be next in line after his older half-brother Khaled, a moderate figure whom Faisal had made crown prince for reasons of seniority and intra-family balance 119 -despite his disinterest in politics and lack of a previous government role. 120 Institutional decisions again followed the royal power balance.
All of the major princes embarked on the expansion of their institutions, which became irreducibly identified with their person. Growing budgets allowed for ambitious programs, most remarkably among them Sultan's expansion of the Saudi air force in the 1960s. 121 Staff numbers, business opportunities and networks of gatekeepers, brokers and business partners expanded concurrently. As the Ministry of Defence was organized around Sultan (and to a lesser extent his full brother deputies), all of its organizational units were oriented towards him as central authority. Armed services and Ministry itself hence cooperated little. 122 Similarly, Abdallah was the figure around which the National Guard was organized concentrically. Foreign specialists assessed the Guard's chains of command as ill-defined and over-centralized. As the Guard was also a government agency, the presence of civilians in its headquarters, accountable only to Abdallah, decreased its administrative coherence. 123 Faisal and the civil service: slow regularization
Beyond the "sovereignty ministries", most of the other posts in the 1962 cabinet were controlled by commoners, as Faisal strove to limit the number of princes in the cabinet to make it manageable 124 -another pattern which would become "locked in", as most of the cabinet posts reserved for non-royals then have been held by commoners until now.
A stable distribution of power did not automatically mean integrated government. Under
Faisal the Saudi administration still suffered from enduring problems of over-centralization and lack of coordination between agencies. 125 As institutions grew in parallel, functionally similar bureaucratic units reported to different ministries, and duplication and conflicts of authority were endemic. 126 As all actors were oriented towards Faisal, there was little horizontal communication of commoner bureaucrats, while Faisal's brothers were busy building their fiefdoms. The phenomenon of "paper agencies" persisted, e.g. when a Ministry of Justice was decreed in 1962 but not actually set up until 1971. All good intentions of development planning got lost somewhere between agency conflicts and an insufficient data base. 127 The Central Planning Organization, set up in 1964, had little leverage over other ministries during most of the 1960s, 128 and several ministries never submitted their financial reports to the Ministry of Finance. 129 However, different from the sprawl of the state in the 1950s, there was a clear regularization of bureaucratic growth -both in terms of stability of the overall set-up and of internal bureaucratization of institutions. The set-up became less fluid.
Although facing an acute shortage of qualified administrators, Faisal managed to assemble some good commoner ministers around him, which might explain that at least some decisions were carried through. 130 "Elsewhere", as one UK diplomatic source explains, "as so often in developing countries, it [was] the bureaucratic bindweed that [took] root and proliferated most quickly, its function being to choke decision and action."
The "bureaucratic bindweed" however did go along with institutionalization of the civil service, making for gradual institutional consolidation. Faisal achieved a discernible rationalization of the bureaucracy. As early as June 1958, a royal decree was issued reforming the civil service. It clarified the classification of employees, salary schedules and criteria for hiring and terminating employment. 131 The use of public offices for private gain was prohibited and severe penalties threatened. Private business activities of bureaucrats were very common at the time, and the Americans rated the decree as a serious attempt by Faisal to decrease malpractice. 132 To be sure, overcoming the shortage of qualified and committed personnel was an uphill struggle in a grossly undereducated society. 133 In the early 1960s, the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) in Riyadh was set up with international assistance and imparted basic administrative skills on increasing numbers of Saudis. Having to start almost from scratch, its impact was only gradual. At the end of the 1960s, the pool of skilled administrators was still very small and recruitment often based on nepotism. 134 Many bureaucrats were involved in business interests tied to their respective agency. 135 Absenteeism was rampant, 136 and attempts by a large Ford Foundation consultancy mission in the 1960s to create a merit-based public service did not yield significant results, as the "Central Personnel Bureau" proved unable to break into the turf of other ministries. 137 Faisal's own commitment to orderly and rule-bound administration should not be overstated. In his context, he was austere, 138 but that did not mean that he did not have his own trustees, brokers and business clients whom he would pay off through various ways. 139 The Alireza family, close to Faisal since his time as Hijazi viceregent, was amply supplied with defense-related contracts. 140 Princes from Faisal's own family branch were heavily involved in business. 141 Although the clientelist distribution of budgets and deals was relatively well-controlled under Faisal, his rule was no exception to the basic pattern. 142 Still, all nepotism and clientelism occurred within a progressively bureaucratized institutional setting, whose main components and cleavages did not change fundamentally after the early 1960s. The 1971 comprehensive civil service law led to further consolidation of bureaucratic rules and clearer formal concepts of salary scales, seniority and hierarchy. 143 The
Institute of Public Administration augmented its profile under the leadership of Abdalaziz
Quraishi in the late 1960s, and increasing numbers of foreign-trained Saudis entered public service. 144 The internal structures of agencies, though still fluid in many cases, were much better defined and permanent than ten years earlier.
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The bureaucratic immortalization of fiefdoms in the 1970s
When the Saudi system entered its final and dizzying phase of expansion after the 1973 oil boom, this expansion happened much more orderly and based on existing institutions than that of the 1950s. 146 Paradoxically, bureaucratization and state growth also led to the entrenchment of existing fiefdoms in the boom -the final phase of state growth. As the budget quadrupled and total state employees increased from 52.000 in 1960 to 124.000 in 1970, 147 royals had growing powers of patronage in their realms, while the entrenchment of civil service rules made for increased institutional stability on lower levels. 148 The defence budget, usually above one quarter of overall state expenditure, allowed Prince
Sultan to expand his ministerial fiefdom to a full "state within a state", attaching large-scale housing, health and educational infrastructure to his ministry. The National Guard under Abdallah developed similar structures on a smaller scale, having its own "cities" and parallel housing, education and health systems. 151 The Ministry of
Interior under Fahd and Nayef, dubbed a "rule unto itself" 152 by a seasoned British diplomat, also built up its own infrastructure.
All of the major fiefs conferred enormous patronage power to their heads, through the sheer scale of employment, 153 the provision of select services and numerous business contracts of various sizes. Considerable parts of society were drawn into the orbit of the big government agencies as clients in one form or another. 154 The dynamics of growth would often reinforce segmentation: Ministry of Defense, National Guard and Ministry of Interior seem to have seen repeated competition over budget allocations, and there was a persistent overlap in security functions. 155 The autonomous power of senior princes meant that they would ignore budgetary rules in their procurement, undermining coherent economic planning. 156 The parallel build-up of independent housing and health services prevented integrated sectoral policies. 157 The parallel power bases of princes would make national decision-making and, on a lower level, day-to-day policy coordination more difficult.
Segmentation was reproduced on a smaller scale among agencies headed by trusted commoners. Due to the underdevelopment of general infrastructure and public services, agencies under conditions of fiscal abundance strove to create their own services to be able to develop autonomously. 158 Institutions would function in more predictable and formal ways than in past decades; the civil service law was refined in 1977 and a further empowered Civil Service Bureau created. 159 However, the persistent hierarchical orientation of various agencies meant that they often coordinated little in policy and budgeting matters. In the process of rapid growth they would acquire their own vested interests -and typically, their own housing and other infrastructure annexes, and in at least one case, their own TV studio and gas station services. 160 However, similar to the case of SAMA in the 1950s, further state expansion in the 1970s and early 1980s also allowed for some new islands of efficiency to emerge, staffed by the most promising technocrats and given relative autonomy from the rest of the civil service.
These include the Saudi Ports Authority, the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation and the Riyadh Development Authority. 161 Although the core structure of state and regime remained unaltered, the oil boom still allowed for new institutional creations on a technocratic level, offering great mobility to aspiring administrators, some of them successfully co-opted into the system despite their originally leftist leanings. 162 Similarly, the boom was the last time when new big business names were added to those that had emerged in the 1950s, most saliently that of later Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who became a billionaire construction magnate under the patronage of King Fahd.
Mobility closure and congealment
The institutional fluidity of the 1950s and 1960s and the enduring mobility in the 1970s
and early 1980s stand in sharp contrast to the stasis and mobility closure since the mid-1980s:
Since the end of the boom, the expansion of the Saudi state has largely stopped, and with it change and mobility within the system. The institutions created since the early 1950s have congealed into a permanent set-up -through bureaucratic formalization and resource constraints, but also through the sheer size and scope of the state.
Some well-known facts suffice to illustrate how the end of the boom has brought and end to the internal dynamic of the Saudi system: Not only have all the leading princes clung to their posts (until death in the case of Fahd), but Saudi business has seen very few big newcomers since the oil bust in 1986. The turnover of technocrats in the cabinet has decreased markedly, with their average age strongly increasing.
There has been little change in the set-up of government agencies, which have proven to persist once they had grown. The socio-economic entitlements created through state growth seem to have fettered the once so autonomous system, with the wage bill steadily increasing as share of public expenditure between the early 1980s and the late 1990s. As more social groups have been tied to the state through the formalized clientage of employment and service provision, the government, it appears, has become increasingly immobile, largely incapable or unwilling to impose cuts on the public payroll and subsidized public services. 163 The stickiness of bureaucratic employment prevents institutional re-engineering. Policy in the last 20 years has been limited mostly to "putting out fires", with few grand initiatives.
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Conclusion
For those who know the modern Saudi bureaucratic behemoth, its unmovable institutions and administrative stasis, the great fluidity of early years as traced in this article is hard to imagine. The modern Saudi bureaucracy was created in the 1950s and early 1960s by an elite which was largely unconstrained by society or established bureaucratic structures.
The rapid, personalized creation of government institutions happened in a completely topdown fashion and in a relative political vacuum. Political agency and voluntarism determined state formation at least as much as the development needs of Saudi society did. The Al Saud laterally expanded into a state apparatus which was most of all geared upon their internal distribution of power. The rapid shifts in institutional design reflected the unique autonomy of the early Saudi rentier state and its role as playing field for intra-elite balancing games.
Saudi bureaucracy-building often seems to be a case not of "form follows function", but of "form follows family". Institutional reforms often were instruments in an intra-elite power game as much as attempts to modernize the state. Where Yizraeli sees primarily a clash between different ideologies of rule and development between Saud and Faisal, the present account adds a rather more instrumental view of institutional initiatives by both players, with institutions as flexible tokens of power. It is not possible to glean specific princely motivations from the archival record on every single institutional decision. We do know however that power politics within the family -whatever its details -consistently loomed very large when it came to negotiating institutional change, like no other consideration. Defense, the Vice Ministry of Finance, the large size of the National Guard, the omnipresent role of the Ministry of Interior -all are outcomes of the politics of the day which happened to be perpetuated by bureaucratic growth and/or agreements to maintain a given power balance.
Similarly, the composition of significant parts of the Saudi private sector is an outcome of often chance encounters which happened many decades ago. The expanding Saudi rentier state provides powerful examples of "path-dependency", the idea that relatively small early events can have a strong influence on subsequent structural developments. The rapid growth of rentier states can lead to a "telescoping" effect, magnifying the effects of early decisions manifold, and locking them in as states grow mature and harder to change.
More than any other event, the 1962 cabinet deal shaped the face of Saudi politics for the subsequent half century, but it also appears somewhat contingent in retrospective: There were e.g. reported offers by Saud to make Fahd his prime minister, which the latter rejected. 166 Had
Fahd accepted, Saudi Arabia and its institutions of governance would look much different today. There were also rumours that Mohammad bin Abdalaziz, an irascible older brother of Fahd, could be made Minister of Finance, which again would have changed the balance of power -and quite likely, institutions -tremendously. Ironically, in the first place it had been the lack of clearly defined bureaucratic hierarchies which tended to give institutions the character of personal courts and enabled small-scale empire-building. With formal procedures under-defined, ministries were frequently used for patronage and to recruit allies -not only by royals, but also by well-positioned commoners, several of whom left their mark on the Saudi state.
As the state grew more complex and the Al Saud delegated authority only in specific institutional contexts, the fragmentation of the state did not disappear, but was often consolidated through bureaucratization. While Faisal's over-centralization persisted, agencies often kept their island character, communicating mostly vertically.
Again, many institutional idiosyncrasies of Saudi Arabia would not be thinkable without rent surpluses that allowed institutional sprawl and costly redundancy. In a starkly contrasting example from an originally quite similar country, John Davis has argued that oil rents in Libya allowed for the experiment of abolishing significant parts of the state. 169 What these two most different oil states seem to demonstrate is that rents can most of all allow for unusual, possibly dysfunctional institutional experiments -without predicting what these will look like.
Approaching rentier states from this angle, the focus is once more on contingency and agency, which are in turn crucial to understand the internal heterogeneity of the Saudi state:
Oil income has in some cases has allowed for the creation of very efficient bureaucratic islands -SAMA et al, where select commoners played crucial roles -, but in others has boosted neo-patrimonialism. As long as the system expanded, oil created great leeway to do design institutions freely and in very different ways. Generalizations about the nature of the state are hence difficult: As political agency intervenes, rents do not automatically create inefficiency and corruption. At the same time, rapidly increasing rents might create a temptation to build institutional fiefdoms, as these can be convenient devices to cement coalitions within the elite. Again, this is not an automatic outcome, but the record of other oil states indicate that it is a distinct possibility yet overlooked by rentier theories. 170 Sarah Yizraeli contends that the management of family politics through handing over control of functionally differentiated formal institutions to senior royal players is more modern that the old patrimonialism under Ibn Saud and his first successor, centred mostly on the king's court. As soon as individual formal posts become royal fiefs of their own, this judgment might be questionable. The paradox of Saudi state development is that modern, differentiated bureaucracy and royal patrimonialism have grown concurrently.
